Christology as defined by the ecumenical councils quickly leads to contradictions, or at least apparent contradictions. Since the Council of Chalcedon holds that Christ is both God and human, one can infer contradictory claims, such as that Christ is mutable and not mutable. Theologians use different methods to address Christological contradictions. Some contend that they are only apparent contradictions. Others hold the contradictions to be true while eliminating logic from theology. Jc Beall takes a different approach. Beall’s approach in The Contradictory Christ is to hold Christological contradictions as real and true while preserving a place for reason and logic in theology.
Beall identifies the central problem of Christology to be the assertion that Christ is God (and therefore limitless) and also human (and therefore limited). Moreover, Christ possesses divine and human properties in a real, full way. Beall finds efforts to use classical logic to give a logically consistent account of Christ wanting. They either fall short of the full affirmation of Christ’s divinity or humanity, or they fail to give a logically consistent account. Beall contends that a contradictory Christology can better express the full divinity and humanity of Christ. Yet Beall rejects fideism. He retains logic without requiring logical consistency, arguing that some domains of inquiry allow for contradictions (e.g., theology) while others do not (e.g., mathematics).
Beall’s central claim is that some contradictions are true in theology because “Christ is a contradictory being” (3). He turns to first-degree entailment, a form of subclassical logic, as the correct account behind a logical method suited for Christology. In order to show how contradictions may be true, Beall offers a careful analysis of truth conditions for an atomic sentence based on the extension of the predicate. The set of objects or possibilities in the world that make a predicate true is its extension; the set that make a predicate false is its antiextension. “An atomic sentence is true if and only if the denotation of the singular term (e.g., name) is in the extension of the predicate. An atomic sentence is false if and only if the denotation of the singular term (e.g., name) is in the antiextension of the predicate” (19). There is nothing in logic itself, Beall contends, that makes it impossible for the same object to be in both the extension and antiextension of a sentence. Some objects in some field may appear in both, a surprising but logically valid possibility.
According to this analysis of truth conditions, a true contradiction is a sentence in which the thing denoted by the subject is in both the extension and the antiextension of the predicate. Beall defines a contradiction as a sentence that claims “It is true that…and it is false that…” in which the ellipses are replaced by the same words (6). Using immutability as an example, Beall claims that the sentence “It is true that Christ is immutable and it is false that Christ is immutable” is a true contradiction, since “Christ” is in both the extension and antiextension of “immutable.” The same analysis would deem other contradictions about Christ (omnipotent, not omnipotent, etc.) true.
By moving away from classical logic, Beall removes strictures against contradictions and excluded middles from Christology. Since classical logic does not allow “gluts” (sentences that are both true and false) or “gaps” (sentences that are neither true nor false), Beall thinks it is unsuited for Christology. Such restrictions in classical logic, Beall holds, were developed for the field of mathematics and serve well within the discipline. But in theology a given sentence may be true, false, both true and false, or neither true nor false. Of greatest import for a contradictory Christology is to allow for gluts by limiting the law of non-contradiction in theology.
The success of Beall’s project hinges on his account of logic, particularly the elimination of the law of non-contradiction. Beall takes up the question directly, arguing that objections to Christological contradictions are grounded in an overly-restrictive classical logic that cannot account for the existence of a contradictory being like Christ (78–82). In short, the reality of Christ is one marker used to determine correct logic. On this point Beall’s approach is close to other Christological strategies, such as the redefinition of terms (like “human being”) in light of Christ undertaken by theologians like William Ockham, Gabriel Biel, and Martin Luther. Like these approaches, Beall’s project is vulnerable to critiques of arbitrary rules. And, like other theologians, Beall can reply that Christology provides a fuller picture of all reality that calls for a reassessment of logic, semantics, and the like in light of Christ.
Several unanswered questions leave the success of Beall’s approach in doubt. Here I briefly mention a few epistemological concerns. Beall contends that true contradictions are rare and most contradictions are false. But how can one determine when a contradiction is true and when it is false? Beall is intentionally agnostic on this question, asserting the importance of searching for the truth without giving a final recipe for separating truth from untruth (61–67). This agnosticism leads to more questions: If the project is merely constructing a formal logic to account for Christological contradictions, what relation does this logic have to determining truth? If this system of logic cannot distinguish true and false contradictions, how useful is it for pursuing truth of any sort, and can it avoid the classic principle of explosion (the idea that if contradictions are granted, then everything may be inferred)? And can the system eliminate tautologies so that Christological predicates are non-trivial statements that say something about Christ?
The strengths and weaknesses of the book are encapsulated in the final chapter on the Trinity, considered in light of contradictory theology. Like the entire book, this chapter is clear, engaging, and provocative. Beall offers a helpful and precise definition of the problem of the Trinity: three persons who have genuine identity and genuine difference. Does this reduce to another true contradiction? Beall replies: “I don’t know” while gesturing toward more in-depth work on the question in the future (156). Readers interested in Christology, the place of logic in theology, and related questions will find it rewarding to think along with Beall about such questions.
Aaron Moldenhauer is assistant professor of theology at Concordia University Wisconsin.
Aaron Moldenhauer
Date Of Review:
January 23, 2023