In the introduction to The Saint and the Atheist: Thomas Aquinas and Jean-Paul Sartre, Joseph S. Catalano asks “what is the difference between Hitler and Ghandi except how their freedom was one with their bodies, and how each interpreted and willed the world, through… the ways their bodies fitted within the world?” (5). It is clear from the beginning that this work is motivated by a desire to provide an integrative philosophical understanding of the way mind and body come together to shape our world through action. In particular, Catalano aims to encourage a view that supports political action that alleviates the suffering of those who are less privileged. To do so, Catalano, a Sartre scholar, proposes to combine Aquinas’ understanding of the integrated relationship between the intellectual and material aspects of human existence with Sartre’s accounts of freedom, good faith, and the person as a universal singular. Reaching back to his dissertation on the Angelic Doctor over 30 years prior, Catalano finds seeds in Aquinas for understanding humanity’s fundamental attunement to reality but sees Sartre as “tightening the bond that exists between the human thinking body and the world” (4).
The title of his book tempts us to bracket our doubt and hope that, as we keep reading, Catalano will solidify what begin as seemingly nebulous connections. One might expect a systematic comparison similar to the comprehensive analysis found in Stephen Wang’s Aquinas and Sartre: On Freedom, Identity, and the Possibility of Happiness (CUA Press, 2009). Or perhaps the contrast between “Saint” and “Atheist” suggests some discussion of how the religious and materialistic orientations of these respective thinkers might impact the ethic that informs human action in the world. Unfortunately, none of these expectations pan out. Instead, Catalano repeatedly uses disparate ideas from Aquinas’ thought to highlight his application of some socio-ethical facet of Sartre’s.
To illustrate, in Chapter 5 Catalano highlights how the Sartrean “look” reveals that human self-consciousness is marked by a fundamental dependence on the other. He goes on to compare Aquinas and Sartre on the limitations of individual human freedom imposed by this dependence. Catalano asserts that “although their reasons are different, their views practically converge” (36). Here, his discussion of Aquinas hinges on a quote asserting that a slave may always maintain his freedom in matters of the mind. But he goes on to argue that Sartre’s view includes a more advanced and nuanced understanding of the ways in which slavery robs the enslaved of their own sense of humanity and freedom. Catalano stops to admit that “the comparison between Aquinas and Sartre is here not clear” (38).
But instead of clarifying, the chapter then meanders into a reflection on the institution of slavery, particularly in the US, and ends in a reminder that we can become more aware of our choices and alter the meaning we give our lives (38). There is no discussion of Aquinas’s account of slavery to support the preferential view he gives Sartre. Neither is there an analysis of his observation that for Aquinas, in matters of basic freedom, “man is…obligated to… God alone” (37), while for Sartre there is no obligation other than the expression of freedom itself. At the end of the chapter we are indeed left considering the deforming impact of slavery on human consciousness, but are no closer to understanding what the discussion of Aquinas has added or how Sartre has further informed our understanding of him.
His discussion of Aquinas’ concept of synderesis is similarly truncated. He pairs Aquinas’ idea of this innate capacity to intuit the good with his directive that we must always follow our conscience to do the good we intuit (26). Catalano sees a direct connection here with Sartre’s concept of good faith. While Aquinas’ account is perhaps consistent with a contemporary popular understanding of “good faith,” it is significantly different from Sartre’s idea, which prioritizes freedom over the good. This difference does not come into play for Catalano, as he seems, like Sartre, to assume they are the same thing.
Catalano writes like someone who has spent his career reading Sartre. His prose is engaging, readable, and filled with images and illustrations that relate philosophical concepts to concrete life. Additionally, the chapters are short, fewer than 10 pages each, which keeps the discussion moving at a steady and manageable pace. In these ways the work is inviting to the non-technical reader. But at the same time, Catalano does not give himself enough space to fully flesh out his ideas. Often Catalano seems to assume some particular connection that he has failed to state explicitly in the text. In the latter half of the book especially, the discussion progresses more like a seasoned scholar bantering with his colleagues in a café than one building and defending a detailed academic argument.
This is not the case, however, in Catalano’s exposition of Sartre’s psychological analyses of Gustave Flaubert and Jean Genet. This detailed and successful discussion illustrates how early influences shape the way humans interact with and orient themselves in the world (chapter 7). Also very insightful is his in-depth discussion of the ways in which universals take shape through our individual actions (chapter 10). Using relatable examples like the game of tennis, he explains clearly the Sartrean model of how our freedom makes the word take on certain concrete forms; and how once our freedom has shaped them, these concrete institutions and structures push back on our freedom. His analysis sheds light on how our agency and responsibility are critical in creating all the aspects of our “games,” including the rules by which we play.
Ultimately, Catalano does leave us thinking about human action, intention, and the way we as individuals shape the world. But he also leaves us thinking that his use of Aquinas as a conversation partner for Sartre is not particularly effective. Because Catalano does not do enough to orient the isolated ideas he has chosen within the overall topography of Aquinas’ thought, readers will have difficulty finding their bearings in his analysis of these two complex thinkers.
Mireille Bishay is an independent scholar, instructor, and researcher working on diverse sources of identity and value in contemporary culture.
Mireille Bishay
Date Of Review:
March 17, 2023
