For Socrates, philosophy and education were inseparable, and his unique way of teaching has given rise to many attempts to employ the “Socratic method” in classrooms and conversations from his time to ours. Yet, for a method so widely admired, the specifics of its pedagogy have remained elusive despite efforts by scholars, educators, and arm-chair philosophers. One reason for this elusiveness may be artificially limited source material. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, scholars explored the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Aristophanes to better understand Socrates’ pedagogy, while works by Xenophon were largely overlooked. However, in the late 20th century there was a resurgence of interest in Xenophon’s writings, due in large part to the work of Leo Strauss (e.g., Xenophon’s Socrates, Cornell University Press, 1972). Building on the work of Strauss, Dustin Sebell’s monograph Xenophon’s Socratic Education: Reason, Religion, and the Limits of Politics, examines Xenophon’s Memorabilia as a resource for understanding Socrates' educational system.
Xenophon’s Memorabilia is a dialogue between Socrates and many of his contemporaries which seeks to defend Socrates from the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Book IV of the Memorabilia introduces a discussion between a young man named Euthydemus and the philosopher Socrates.t is from Book IV that Sebell derives his central thesis: that Socrates employs humor and weak arguments as a tool to indirectly guide students to truth through the facetious education of “bad natures.” To pursue this argument, he has divided the book into three parts, with each section expanding our understanding of his thesis. He includes copious endnotes, a boon for those who may want to do further research into this topic, and readers will not want to skip the introduction where Sebell lays vital groundwork for his project.
In the introduction, Sebell introduces his hermeneutic for reading Xenophon. He argues that, like Socrates, Xenophon employs both exoteric and esoteric teaching, “although the gulf between the exoteric and esoteric teaching is much wider in Xenophon’s writings than in any other philosopher” (11). The distinction between these teachings is most notably connected with the philosophy of Strauss, but Sebell insists that “it would be the height of absurdity to say that the distinction between exoteric and esoteric is ‘Straussian’” (10). Regardless of whether one accepts this distinction, it is essential the reader keep this present to mind as they read Sebell’s work.
Part 1 focuses on the themes of Socratic rhetoric and the teachability of politics. It introduces Euthydemus, a “bad nature” according to Sebell, who is convinced that he has gleaned wisdom from the writings of poets and philosophers. Sebell argues that Socrates recognizes Euthydemus’ self-ignorance and instructs him in a manner worthy of his comportment. His education amounts to little more than arriving at generally accepted principles. But, although Socrates directs his speech to Euthydemus, his intended audience is those “good natures” who may also be listening. When confronted with Socrates’ weak argument, discerning listeners recognize its flaws and perceive it as jest “first, by silently contradicting the teaching, then, by thinking through the assumptions or hypotheses on which the contradiction and the teaching were, each of them, based” (23). This feeble argument functions as a catalyst for internal dialogue, encouraging the exploration of alternative perspectives and allowing the “good nature” to arrive at truth itself without being led to it directly by Socrates.
Part 2 elucidates the method sketched in part 1, showing how Socrates teaches Euthydemus about questions of justice and “the good.” Sebell contends that the “bad natures” are individuals who, due to their self-ignorance, are unable to grasp the truth about justice and “the good.” Euthydemus, for example, not only lacks the capacity for identifying and obtaining “the good,” but he cannot accept his lack of capacity. Sebell states, “Although he [Euthydemus] did not believe he had the power or capacity to obtain ‘the good’ things he wanted, he did not accept the fact that he did not have that power or capacity either” (78). This lack of capacity delineates the “bad natures” and inhibits their capacity for happiness.
Part 3 further develops this paradigm, showing how Socrate’s discussion of both natural theology and natural law can also employ an esoteric/exoteric distinction. Moreover, Sebell returns our focus to a problem posed in the introduction. There he argued that modern political philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas dismiss theological challenges and solutions when considering moral and political questions. Sebell argues that “reason, unable to defend itself, self-destructs” when it does not take seriously an understanding of “self and the world [which] conflicts with our own” (4). In contrast to these modern political philosophers, part 3 shows how Socrates takes seriously such theological matters.
Unlike many scholars who see Euthydemus as an ideal student, Sebell presents him as the epitome of a “bad nature.” While Sebell shows how Euthydemus fails to comprehend the true meaning of Socrates’ teaching, the belief that he is a “bad nature” seems more supported by his Straussian paradigm than by his textual support from Xenophon, the latter of which is reserved for his endnotes (190, n. 15). Regardless of whether one accepts the belief that Euthydemus is a “bad nature,” Sebell’s penetrating analysis still offers valuable insight into Xenophon’s assessment of Socrates, particularly the latter’s views regarding education, political leadership, and natural law.
In sum, Sebell is a careful student of both Socrates and Xenophon, and his insights will reward the diligent reader. Students of the classics, philosophy, and political science will benefit from Sebell’s thorough treatment of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and specialists in theology will find a welcome discussion of natural law and religion. Those interested in the work of Leo Strauss will find a roadmap for the application of Straussian hermeneutics to primary philosophical texts. Those less sympathetic to Strauss will still find a penetrating exegesis of Xenophon’s presentation of Socrates’ pedagogical system.
James Besaw is a graduate student at St. John’s College and Secondary Latin Teacher at The Bear Creek School.
James Besaw
Date Of Review:
May 13, 2024
