Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas

It is rare to have the pleasure of reviewing a book as well argued and well researched as Justin M. Anderson’s Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas. The book is what it advertises and, while Anderson makes a few forays into other disciplines this is a book of Thomistic theology and will appeal primarily to those familiar with the tradition. Anderson has an intimate knowledge of Aquinas’ writings and a familiarity with the secondary literature that is both broad and deep. He is also keenly aware of the challenges of reading a writer over the course of their lifetime and attuned to the realities of intellectual development in Aquinas’ thought.

Anderson’s central thesis in the book is that, while some recent articulations of focus on his philosophical views with little discussion of their overarching theological context, this significantly deforms Aquinas’ position. Anderson sets out to show that virtue in Aquinas’ writings is “inseparable from his understanding of sin, grace, and God’s presence in human life and action” (1). He pursues this goal by drawing out the inner logic of Aquinas’ account of virtue, claiming that its “interconnection with theological topics becomes obvious when we attend to [Aquinas’] own language and various senses of virtue” (307).

Anderson’s provides an in-depth analysis of the differences between perfect and complete virtue, or virtue simpliciter (“absolute”), and imperfect and incomplete virtues, or virtue secundum quid (“relative” or “in a qualified sense,” “falling short of the absolute sense”). Before beginning his discussion of virtue simpliciter, he outlines the nature, kinds, ends, and causes of virtue and examines the development of Aquinas’ theology of grace over the course of his life. In doing so, he points out that “ultimate end gives shape to [Aquinas’] moral science as a whole and, therefore, to his understanding of virtue” (61). Because of this, only the infused virtues can meet Aquinas’ formal definition of virtue—"a good quality of mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us” (26). The infused virtues constitute virtue simpliciter while the acquired virtues constitute the various forms of virtue secundum quid.

The second and third sections contain the majority of the argument. Here, Anderson explores Aquinas’ understanding of virtue simpliciter and virtue secundum quid respectively in terms of the conditions for their beginning (chapters 4 and 7), the conditions for the preservation (chapters 5 and 8), and their respective ends (chapters 6 and 9): friendship with God and natural happiness. Anderson’s analysis of Aquinas’ work is careful, sensitive to the possibility of development in his ideas, but also distinguishes between authentic changes and expansions that hold true to previous views.

In parts 1 and 2, Anderson argues that grace is foundational to Aquinas’ moral science, but this raises the question of what virtue secundum quid, which can also be understood as graceless or pagan virtue, is really like and the degree to which it is possible. Anderson retains an optimistic account of Aquinas’ view of pagan virtue, but his optimism is not based on the extent of human capacities. He identifies three conditions for goodness in a human act: it must be ordainable to the true ultimate end, it must issue from a good principle, and it must follow right reason (184–185). However, he argues that these are all properly oriented toward God and the fallen human is incapable of achieving them by his own power. Even in fallen humans, divine aid is needed for virtue to exist.

This account of pagan virtue raises a few problems that Anderson handles effectively. Two of these stand out. First, it raises the question of how we can retain an optimistic view of the possibility of pagan virtue if divine aid is needed for even pagan virtue to exist, since pagan virtue is by definition shorn of grace. This gives rise to second question: If the end of pagan virtue is pagan happiness, and pagan virtue requires divine aid to exist, is pagan happiness itself not simply another form of grace?

In response to the first question, Anderson appeals to Aquinas’ theory of natural divine application. He argues that God serves as the primary efficient cause of every human action, and thus that divine providence plays a significant role even in pagan action (194–216). On this account, neither habitual sanctifying grace nor a special divine premotion is necessary for God to aid the unbeliever in pursuing a virtuous life. In response to the second question, Anderson borrows from both Henri de Lubac’s analysis of pagan happiness as a gift of grace, and Lawrence Feingold’s account of pagan happiness as an elicited desire. While he largely agrees with Feingold’s critique of Lubac, he highlights challenges raised by Feingold’s own account of pagan happiness. He charts a middle path, arguing that pagan happiness is a natural desire potentially actualizable in the human person, but that it must be drawn out by a consideration of God’s nature as seen in his effects, and actual existence in an individual is conditional upon this consideration (252–261). Thus, pagan happiness is not simply another form of grace, but is nonetheless a participation, even though imperfect, incomplete, and remote, in the beatitude (282–286).

Anderson’s argument highlights three important failures often found in treatments of Aquinas’ ethics. First, it is possible to simply conflate virtue simpliciter and virtue secundum quid. Second, it is possible to “Pelagianize” Aquinas’ account by eliding the important relationships that exist between virtue, grace, sin, and divine providence. Third, it is possible to commit a less extreme version of the second error by acknowledging the human need for grace due to sin’s corruption, but failing to recognize that grace is inherent in Aquinas’ understanding of the good human life (307–308). Anderson carefully and effectively exegetes Aquinas’ internal logic of virtue and of the place and role of virtue in Aquinas’ overarching theological framework.

This monograph significantly impacts  how we understand Aquinas’ theory of virtue. It should also have an important impact on the discussion of pagan virtue within Thomism. Finally, reading from a Protestant perspective, it also significantly impacts how we should understand his theory of nature and grace. The book also serves to vaccinate against several common criticisms of Aquinas in Protestant circles, and provides a warning against the habit of insufficiently attending to the theological context of Aquinas’s philosophy.

K. Lauriston Smith is an adjunct instructor at Grand Canyon University.

Kyle Lauriston Smith

Date Of Review:

August 27, 2024