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Eastern Philosophy
The Basics, 2nd Ed.
Series: The Basics
246 Pages
- Paperback
- ISBN: 9781138215788
- Published By: Routledge
- Published: September 2018
$24.95
What is eastern philosophy? Victoria Harrison addresses this question at the beginning of Eastern Philosophy: The Basics. It is not, she tells us, an emic (insider perspective) distinction. No thinkers in south or east Asia, prior to modern times, would have considered their work in terms of a monolithic entity called "eastern philosophy.” Rather, it is an etic (outsider perspective) distinction made by 19th-century western scholars that unfortunately continues to operate today as a normalizing distinction that myopically privileges western philosophy.
The distinction between “eastern” and “western” philosophy is not necessarily normalizing, however. It can, for instance, simply point to multiple practices of philosophizing in Asian cultural contexts. Harrison glosses philosophizing as ways of thinking and talking about perennial human questions such as “What is the self?” or “What is the best way to live?” Philosophizing, in fact, takes place practically everywhere. (She tells readers that “this may turn out to be the most contentious claim” [4] made in the book.) Global philosophy describes her multicultural approach to philosophizing. Global philosophers bring multiple perspectives to bear on these key questions and build multicultural bridges of understanding between different traditions of inquiry. Harrison demonstrates the advantages of global philosophy in her clear, well-organized discussion of texts and thinkers from the Chinese and Indian traditions.
Harrison’s discussion of Indian philosophy is organized around the problem of ignorance, particularly how the human condition can be described as ignorance of the fundamental nature of reality and the true self (chapter 1). Philosophy in South Asia begins in the debates between different darśanas (philosophical orientations). For the darśanas, the key epistemological issue facing any knowledge claim is source. Four different sources were distinguished, though disputes tended to concentrate on inference and verbal testimony. Another epistemological issue is perspective. The Jaina darśana held that reality cannot be encompassed by any single perspective. They thus sought to accommodate diverse viewpoints within a pluralist logical system—an early example of what takes place today under the rubric of global philosophy.
Cutting through the problem of ignorance reveals two metaphysical questions (chapter 2). The first concerns the relationship between ultimate reality and the world of experience, while the second speculates about the reality of the world of experience, or saṃsāra. In fact, the questions are linked. The Advaita Vedantins (members of the non-dualist school), for example, identify ultimate reality with Brahman-ātman (“abiding self”), holding saṃsāra to be mere illusion. The Samkhya darśana, in turn, distinguished two realities: inert pure consciousness and active primordial matter, identifying the true self with pure consciousness. The problem of karma, however, requires the relationship between true and empirical selves to be clarified (chapter 3). While Advaita Vedantins viewed the true self as ātman, Buddhists developed the concept of anātman, or “no abiding self.” Despite their many differences, both Advaita Vedantins and Buddhists agree that final liberation is to be had in the recognition that empirical selves are at once untrue and unreal.
Chinese philosophers likewise concentrated on the human person, especially ethical questions such as how to become good and how to live a good life (chapter 4). Kongzi (known in the West as Confucius) teaches that practice or learning is the way to become good (ren). Learning concentrates on ritual (li), which for Kongzi covers all of everyday life. Kongzi views the self as particular yet extended throughout society by means of human relations. Li is, thus, practical knowledge about how persons act appropriately in the skein of social relations. Mozi challenged Kongzi on this point, claiming that all people, being essentially equal, should be treated the same regardless of one’s relationship to them. Harrison observes that Mozi can be rightfully described as the originator of philosophy in China to the extent that he introduced a “culture of argumentation” (133) in his criticism of Kongzi. Later Confucians, such as Mengzi and Xunzi, utilized argumentation to develop their views on the role played by human nature in learning.
Daoist thinkers advanced a competing understanding of human nature, one that identifies the source of authentic existence with Dao (chapter 5). But Dao stubbornly resists articulation. Laozi, in the Daodejing, refers to Dao as the nameless and points to the image of an unhewn block. Because Dao is immanent in all things, a good life is one lived in harmony. Unlike Kongzi’s emphasis on self-effort and learning, Laozi pointed to wuwei, or action in accordance with nature (for this idea he uses the image of flowing water). Zhaungzi understood wuwei to undermine any perspective-independent claim to truth. True knowledge consists in recognizing the limitations of one’s own perspective and practicing detachment. Wuwei manifests as a practice of playful wandering in the world inclusive of multiple perspectives. Another practice (“fasting of the heart”) brings attention inward and dissolves the apparent distinction between things. Both practices, in their own way, subvert attachment.
The introduction of Indian Buddhism in the Chinese intellectual context gave rise to two influential philosophical developments (chapter 6). The first is Chan Buddhism, which combined Chaungzi’s practice of wuwei with two Buddhist concepts. The first concept is “Buddha-nature,” which is immanent in all human beings, thus rendering everyone capable of attaining Buddhahood. The second concept, drawing from the writings of Nāgārjuna, emphasizes the emptiness of experience. The immediate, non-discursive recognition of indwelling Buddha- nature results in enlightenment. The second development is Neo-Confucianism. These thinkers begin with Laozi’s image of Dao as the nameless unhewn block prior to all named things. This is, Harrison observes, the traditional metaphysical problem of the one and the many. The question driving these Neo-Confucian inquiries concerns how knowledge of the one is obtained. Zhu Xi takes the familiar Confucian approach (learning the classics and practicing ritual). Wang Yangming, in contrast, advocates introspection. Both thinkers hold that their epistemic approaches yield transmuting knowledge of one’s true self.
Chan Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism provide historical examples of global philosophy. As Harrison discusses in her closing chapter, global philosophy should not be imagined as the dream of a reductive philosophical Esperanto. A global philosopher is, we might say, better likened to a philosophical polyglot who is capable of bringing multiple perspectives to bear on big questions. Eastern Philosophy: The Basics shows Harrison to be a skillful global philosopher in her own right. Besides recommendations for further reading, she provides helpful resources for the pronunciation of Sanskrit and Chinese terms and names. Harrison’s lucid exposition and sensible prose makes this book a good recommendation for students and anyone wishing to learn more about the philosophical traditions of China and India. It is certainly essential reading for any philosophers who might look askance at the very idea of philosophy outside of the western tradition.
Stephen Dawson is associate professor of religious studies and chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lynchburg.
Stephen DawsonDate Of Review:March 31, 2022
Victoria S. Harrison is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Macau, China. She has extensive experience of teaching Indian and Chinese philosophies and has published widely in the subject areas of Philosophy and Religion.