As the title suggests, Tragic Dilemmas in Christian Ethics is devoted to tragic dilemmas. Kate Jackson-Meyer argues aptly that such a category has been overlooked in Christian ethics and that its absence causes theoretical and practical problems.
For Jackson-Meyer, tragic dilemmas involve situations where a moral agent chooses, with sufficient knowledge, among “conflicting nonnegotiable moral obligations rooted in Christian commitments to protect human life and the vulnerable” (1-2). In such instances, otherwise good agents perform moral transgressions in an attempt to act in the best way possible (27). The result is that tragic dilemmas “produce wounds that moral agents must carry” (170) and end up marring an agent's life (99). For this reason, making space for such a category in ethical reflection is essential. When tragic dilemmas are unrecognized, the hurt and destruction they cause in people's lives are “overlooked by ethical systems and strategies that claim to settle hard cases” (109). Furthermore, the failure to recognize tragic dilemmas leads us to overlook the unjust social structures and social sins that cause them (122-3). Yet, the Christian community is called to lament and fight against social injustices and open a path to healing for those they scar. These fundamental ethical tasks risk being forgotten if ethical analysis does not acknowledge and account for the reality of tragic dilemmas.
As she makes her compelling case for the role of tragic dilemmas in the moral life, Jackson-Meyer critiques some of the principles that have prevented the theological and philosophical tradition from coming to terms with them. First, she disputes the principle that “Ought Implies Can,” which avers that “obligations are lifted when they are impossible to fulfill due to the circumstances” (61). The experience of regret and remorse, though, alert us to the fact that some oughts remain even when it is not possible to fulfill them and that agents cannot simply move on after facing a tragic dilemma as if nothing had happened (36). Second, she questions the validity of a “hierarchy of goods” approach, which affirms that it is always possible to rank and order different goods in ways that eliminate conflicts. Instead, tragic moral dilemmas present the agent with goods of equal value, as when medical professionals deliberate about which patient receives the one available ventilator, or when parents have to choose to preserve the life of only one of their children (89). Third, Jackson-Meyer thinks that contemporary proponents of the principle of double effect are wrong when they explain away tragic moral dilemmas by asserting that the foreseen but unintended bad consequences of an action should leave an agent untroubled, as if her good conscience is left unmarred by the evil that results from her actions (97-8). Finally, the author finds the category of intrinsic evil, often relied on by those who deny the reality of tragic dilemmas, to be “too fraught to be helpful” (91).
The book also includes helpful reflections on the interaction between social structures, culpability, and agency. In particular, Jackson-Meyer argues that the agent maintains moral responsibility in the case of tragic dilemmas because “we are morally responsible for requirements grounded in the sacredness of human life and vulnerability” (114). At the same time, though, constrained situations that are often the result of unjust social structures diminish the person's culpability. Being alert to the reality of tragic dilemmas allows us to notice the unjust social structures that force agents into tragic situations and work to transform them (169).
Jackson-Meyer ends her work with a chapter on Christian approaches to healing after tragic dilemmas. In it, she emphasizes the importance of communal and embodied practices that, starting from recognizing the harm done, truth-telling, and attentiveness to a person's particularity, help agents hurt by tragic dilemmas integrate them into their self-understanding (138). The Christian community is called to help moral agents “accept moral responsibility for the event without erroneously thinking that the event somehow makes them 'bad' or irredeemable” (169).
Tragic Dilemmas in Christian Ethics offers an important contribution to contemporary Christian ethics by introducing a concept, tragic dilemmas, which has been overlooked for too long. However, more work needs to be done to integrate tragic dilemmas into other essential categories in Christian ethics, in general, and the Catholic moral tradition, in particular. The quick dismissal of the idea of “intrinsic evil” is unconvincing, given its weight in the Catholic theological and magisterial tradition. Furthermore, even the critiques of double effect could be qualified by appealing to more nuanced descriptions of the principle, rather than the maximalist versions the author takes issue with. Finally, Jackson-Meyer's appeals to experience as an essential source for moral analysis call for further examination of the relationship between the agents' perspective and other sources of moral reflection, such as Scripture and natural law.
That the book opens such areas for further discussion and study is a testament to its timeliness and worth. People interested in Christian ethics and Catholic moral theology will greatly benefit from reading it.
Alessandro Rovati is department chair and associate professor of theology at Belmont Abbey College.
Alessandro Rovati
Date Of Review:
September 26, 2023