Some historians argue that America was founded as a “Christian” nation, but most scholars consider this argument false. In Why Religion is Good for American Democracy, Robert Wuthnow takes the conversation in another direction, noting the religious diversity present at America’s founding and arguing that this pluralism allows religion to play a valuable role in democracy (in contrast to shriller tomes that warn religion should have no place in public deliberation). Organized chronologically, the book moves decade by decade starting with the New Deal, showing how various coalitions of religious allies and opponents shaped public debate and public policy.
The book begins with religious responses to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. While the parallels between arguments over government provision of social welfare in that era and our current day are evident, the book does not explain them explicitly. More than half of the population of the United States belonged to congregations at the time of the New Deal’s design. For some congregations, a federal government provision of a social safety net ran against the grain of an American spirit that valorized hardship, struggle, and discipline.
According to this logic, “[the New Deal] depended too much on esoteric ideas about monetary policy and not enough on old-fashioned ingenuity and sacrifice” (38). Some religious believers felt that the centralization of social services meant communities lost their freedom to provide support as they saw fit, while others welcomed the services as a key way to address social problems. These responses lined up with theological positions: those who supported the New Deal were Christians who embraced the “Social Gospel” movement, viewing religion as a force for transforming society. Those who opposed the New Deal came from more “conservative” denominations that stressed individual responsibility and local control. But as the book notes, those who opposed the New Deal spoke through “elite” organizations and lacked the grassroot networks of the organizations supporting the New Deal.
The book then turns to religious responses to World War II and the development of conscientious objection policies, whereby individuals could avoid serving on the front lines because of their religious beliefs. The churches were divided by the war. Some traditions invoked “just war” principles to defend fighting while others argued that Jesus’ teachings forbid Christians from using violence in any circumstance. The book notes three levels of response: the first occurred at the religious community level (presumably national denominations who formulated policies), the second at the congregational level, and the third at the individual level. The chapter focuses pn the differing positions of various churches. The central question asked by the churches— “how can individuals fulfill what some see as their duty to the state while maintaining the freedom to follow their religious teachings?—is still with us today. Some religious denominations felt that all Americans should serve, while others said that individuals who belonged to churches that advocated pacifism (Quakers, Brethren, and a few others) should not be forced to violate their conscious. Interestingly, after the war, only those claiming conscientious objection on the basis of a belief in a divine being, rather than a philosophical objection to war, was allowed.
The book then moves on to the provision of welfare and the debates over “Charitable Choice” during the Regan administration. In the 1960s many mainline Christian and Jewish groups supported Great Society anti-poverty programs, but by the 1980s, Regan sought to move welfare provisions from the federal government to churches. However, by this time denominations had already begun to shrink. As the book notes, though, some large churches, especially African American churches such as Allen Methodist Episcopal Church in New York, used federal government money to build a retirement housing complex, and invested in rehabilitating dilapidated buildings for storefronts. It was these efforts that led to the creation of “Charitable Choice,” first proposed by then Senator John Ashcroft, which allows religious and private charitable organizations to win government contracts for social service provision.
Space constraints prohibit discussing Wuthnow’s excellent chapter on wealth inequality during the early 2000s. However, his final historical chapter presents an analysis of religious responses to the early pandemic and attempts to balance religious freedom and public health. Should religious congregations be free to worship as they see fit even if it endangers the health of others? While the legal, theological, and political responses to the pandemic have continued to evolve, this book offers a good overview of the issues at the time of the book’s writing.
Wuthnow’s argument that religious pluralism prevents any one religious position from becoming dominant in American life is convincingly argued, and current polarization seems to bear that out. However, there is more to the issue of religion’s political power than pluralism alone. How involved a religious community is in politics also matters. “Fundamentalist” Christianity, for instance, arose in the United States during the early 20th century. It was only later, in a move that other historians have chronicled, that this group became politically mobilized as the “Religious Right” in American politics. Still, this book makes a convincing case that religious pluralism has checked the power of religious groups and has helped enable a degree of moderation in the democratic politics of the United States.
Aaron Klink is chaplain at Pruitt Health Hospice, Rocky Mount, North Carolina.
Aaron Klink
Date Of Review:
November 30, 2022
